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DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-EFFECT OF DOUBLE DEATH ON RECOVERY
UNDER MINNESOTA "DEATH" AND "SURVIVAL" STATUTES-Recovery was
sought by the surviving spouse and next of kin against the estate of a negligent
'driver where both the passenger and the driver were fatally injured and died
"in the same traffic accident." Held, where both the injured person and the
wrongdoer die, an action survives against the personal representatives of the
wrongdoer. Kuhnle v. Swedlund, 220 Minn. 573, 20 N.W. (2d) 396 (1945).
, Prior to the amendment of the Minnesota "survival" statute 1 in 1941, it
had been held that a cause of action for bodily injuries or death did not survive
the death of the tort-feasor. 2 At thit time the "survival" statute read in part
"a cause of action arising o'lit of an injury to the person dies with the person of
either party, except as provided in §, 96 57," and the "death" statute provided
that 8 " • • • the personal representative of the decedent may maintain an action ••. if he might have maintained an action, had he lived, for an injury
caused by the same act or omission." 4 The "survival" statute was amended in
I 941 5 to read in- part " ... dies wi~h th,e person of the party in who-se favor it
exists, except as provided in Section 96 5 7. It also dies with the person against
whom it exists, except a cause of action arising out of bodily injuries or death
caused by the negligence of a decedent survives against his personal representatives." 6 The "death" statute has not been amended. As pointed out in an article
by Dean Evans of the University of Kentucky Law School,7 three possibilities
present themselves: (1) the injured party may die before the tort-feasor, (2)

Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9656.
Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 500, 5 N.W., 376 (1880); Gilman v. Maxwell,
79 Minn. 377, 82 N.W. 669 (1900); Eklund v. Evans, 2n Minn. 164, 300 N.W.
1

2

617 (1941).
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9657.
,
For an analysis of "death" statutes in other jurisdictions as relates to this problem, see Evans, "Survival of the Action for Death by Wrongful Act," l UNIV., CHI. L.
REV. 102 (1933).
.
5 Minn. Laws (1941) c. 440, Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1941) § 9656.
6 For an analysis of "survival" statutes in other jurisdictions, see Evans, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims for and against Executors and
'Administrators," 29 MicH. L. REv. 969 (1931). See also 27 GEo. L. J. 100 (1938).
7 "Survival of the Action for Death by Wrongful Act," l UNiv. CHI. L. REv .
8

4

. 102 (1933).
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the injured party may die at the same time as the tort-feasor, 8 or (3) the injured party may die after the tort-feasor. The first question seems to be amply
cared for under the present Minnesota law. 9 The principal case is an example of
the second possibility. 10 Assuming that this case does decide that simultaneous
death or even death in a common disaster shall not bar recovery,11 is it altogether
certain that the same result should be reached in the third alternative? 12 It is the
Minnesota view that the "death" statute creates a new cause of action in favor
of the surviving spouse and next of kin, 13 with no provision in that statute regarding against whom it may arise 14 except the common law rule that it must
8
For a thorough discussion of the classes of cases in which survivorship in a common disaster is important, and the difficulties and necessities of evidence involved, see
Tracy and Adams, "Evidence of Survivorship in Common Disaster Cases," 38 MrcH.
L. REv. 801 (1940).
9
It is the general rule that, in the absence of special survival statutes, the death
of a tort-feasor abates an action or right of action against him to recover damages for
personal injuries or for death due to his wrongful or negligent act. For cases arising on
this point, and for the results in several states with special statutes, see 61 A.L.R. 830
( I 929), and the cases subsequently noted.
10
"Where both the wronged person and the wrongdoer die an action survives
against the persona.I representative of the wrongdoer." Principal case at 398, note 5.
11 See 70 A.L.R. 1319 ( I 93 I) and cases subsequently noted for the conflict of
decisions arising on this point. In this field it is important to remember that the provisions of the specific statute of the jurisdiction bearing on the question greatly alter the
decisions in that jurisdiction. For example, Fowlie v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 184
Minn. 82, 237 N.W. 846 (1931), was decided before the Minnesota "survival"
statute had been so amended to allow recovery for bodily injuries or death subsequent to
the time of the tort-feasor's death. It then follows that that case cannot be authority
against recovery for bodily injuries or death when both the tort-feasor and the injured
party die in the same accident, since that question could not be considered under the
then existing statute..However, it has been cited as authority for that proposition. It
is also important to distinguish fact situations clearly, as illustrated By that same case;
for though the injured party's death actually occurred some time after that of the tortfeasor, the case is noted as one bearing on the point of simultaneous death. On the
other hand, it has not been noted as an example of recovery allowed under the fact
situation of the third possibility discussed in the text above, though there are possibilities
that it might be considered as bearing on that point despite the fact that recovery for
wrongful death could not be considered under the then existing statute.
12
See 112 A.L.R. 343 (1938) and cases subsequently noted, for the conflict of
decisions on this point. Although it is true that "while there is but little direct authority upon the question •.. the weight of authority supports the view that no death
action can be maintained where the alleged tort-feasor's death preceded that of his
victim, at least in the absence of clear statutory authority in that regard," there are
some recent cases in honored jurisdictions holding for recovery where death of the tortfeasor preceded that of the wronged party. However, in general it may be said
that these decisions are based upon judicial interpretation of statutes peculiar to those
jurisdictions. The principal case for this latter holding is In re Olney's Estate, 309
Mich. 65, 14 N.W. (2d) 574 (1944), decided by a divided court on a variety of
grounds.
·
18
Fowlie v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 184 Minn. 82, 237 N.W. 846 (1931):
See also L.R.A. 19 l 5 E, I 09 5 ; id. l 104; L.R.A. 1916 D, l 2 l for a survey of the
holdings on this question in other jurisdictions~ and the results which flow from the
variations.
H Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9657.
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arise against a living person. · True, the "survival" statute has been amended to
provide for the survival of causes of action arising out of death,15 but a cause may
not survive which does not exist, and no words in that statute indicate a legislative. intent that such causes of action shall arise against the personal representative if they have not previously arisen against the decedent. The use of the word
"survives'' might indicate the opposite intent. 16 Then if there is no one against
whom the cause of action may arise under the "death" statute, nor any cause
of action to survive under the "survival" statute, is it clear t~at t~e court would
again interpret the legislative intent 17 in terms of the wrongful act as the gist of
the cause of action 18 to say that recovery "for_ the exclusive ~enefit of a surviving
spouse and the next of kin" 19 will no't be barred by the inherently unimportant
fact that the tort-feasor's death actually preceded the injured person's death? 20
. Is it not again timely to quote what has been so often and so·well said? 21 "The
unsatisfactory nature of existing reforms renders doubly desirable the enactment
of survival legislation broad enough to relegate [ this question] •.. once and for
all to the museum of legal antiquities." 22
·

Robert K. Eifler

Minn. Laws (1941) c. 440, Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1941) § 9656.
Beavers v. Putnam, 110 Va. 713, 67 S.E. 353 (1910); Martinelli v. Burke,
298 Mass. 390, IO N.E. (2d) 113 (1937). But compare Kerr v. Basham, 62 S.D.
3or, 252 N.W. 853 (i934), and In re Olney's Estate, 309 Mich. 65, 14 N.W. (2d)
5 74 ( I 944), where different statutory provisions led to a contrary result.
17 " • • • it seems apparent to us that the legislative intent was. to amend the existing.
l"w so as to permit recovery against the personal representative of a ,wrongdoer in cases
such as we have before us. Whether the Legislature chose language which adequately
expresses such intent requires our consideration." Principal case, 20 N.W. (2d) 396 at
397 (1945).
I
•
18 Quoting 25 C.J.S., Death, § 23: "Whether the cause of action under the
statute is deemed a transmitted right, a survival right, or an independent cause of action,
the foundation and gist of it in all cases is the wrongful act which produced the injury
resulting in, the death"; despite the f~ct that this section is concerned, as it states in the
next sentence, with "the nature of the act on which a cause of action may be based."
Id. at 398.
19 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9657.
2 ° For cases holding as suggested see II2 A.L.R. 343 (1937).
21 Evans, "Survival of the Action for Death by Wrongful Act," I UNiv. CHI. L.
REv. 102 (1933); Evans, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort
Claims for and against Executors and Administrators," 29 M1cH. L. REv. 969 (1931);
41LL. L. REV. 425 (1910).
22 48 HARV. L. REv. 1008 at 1013 (1934).
15
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